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Abstract 
This paper examines the capitalization effect of mortgages with favorable terms 
on the coefficient of intra-area dispersion (COD), the statistic commonly used to 
measure assessment uniformity. Regression analysis using data from the 1982 
Census of Governments indicates that as much as one third of the value of the 
1981 state-level CODs can be attributed to the capitalization effects of financing 
rather than assessment performance. Post-1982 improvements in uniformity 
can be expected in light of the sharp decline in non-standard sources of 
mortgage credit. 
Introduction 
Uniform assessment is an essential condition for equity in property tax 
systems. It ensures that tax liabilities and property values are directly related. 
Non-uniformity, characterized by non-trivial variation of the ratio of assessments 
to market values, threatens the link between tax liabilities and property values 
and consequently, systematic tax equity. Thus, non-uniformity in property 
assessments has been considered "the most haunting facet of (the assessor's) 
arena" [8, p. 129]. A gradual erosion of uniformity from the mid-1960's to the 
early 1980's is evident in the coefficient of intra-area dispersion (COD) reported 
in the Census of Governments [15]. The COD measures the average absolute 
percentage deviation of assessment/sales price (A/S) ratios from the median 
A/S ratio in a tax district. For example, in 1966 seventy percent of all tax districts 
in the U.S. maintained a COD of 25 percent or better. By 1976 only 59 percent 
achieved this standard, and the performance in 1981 showed little change. 
The decline in assessment uniformity is especially puzzling considering 
the range of improvements introduced in the assessment field during the same 
period [16], including the growing utilization of computerized mass 
assessment/appraisal techniques, the strengthening of professional standards 
for assessors and appraisers, the enlargement of assessment districts, the 
reduction in overlapping jurisdictions, and reforms in the appeals process. 
These improvements provided a rationale for gains in uniformity, not a decline. 
The emergence of research in the 1970's on the determinants of assessment 
performance can be considered a product of this anomaly.1 
Part of the dispersion of the A/S ratios underpinning the COD is 
commonly attributed to uncontrollable market error resulting from the use of 
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nominal sales prices to represent the market value of property. Given that sales 
prices are stochastic estimates of market values, even the hypothetically perfect 
system would exhibit limited variation of A/S around A/MV. An issue here, 
however, is whether the departures of S from MV are indeed random. Rational 
departures of S from MV have been identified in transactions involving 
capitalization of contingencies [2], imperfect information [9, 13], seller 
opportunity costs [7] and favorable mortgage terms [12]. The effects of these 
departures have not been incorporated in uniformity analysis. Rather, they are 
typically viewed as "uncontrollable" sources of market error, with sufficiently 
inconsequential systematic influences on the COD to preclude commitment of 
resources to capture their effects. Changes in the mortgage credit market in the 
1970's and early 1980's, however, suggest that a closer examination of this 
view is warranted. By 1981, for example, a substantial proportion of housing 
transactions involved favorable mortgage terms. The 1982 Census of 
Governments addressed sources of financing for the first time, revealing that 
nearly 48 percent of all sampled single family (nonfarm) housing transactions in 
1981 involved either the assumption of an existing mortgage or a seller-
financed first mortgage. 
The capitalization effects associated with favorable mortgage terms were 
thought by Welch [17] to be a reason why the Census COD findings for 
California indicated less uniformity than the CODs obtained from state appraisal 
surveys. This disparity was initially observed in the 1972 Census following a 
1971 ammendment to the state's Revenue and Taxation Code that required 
assessors to adjust the sale prices of transactions with favorable mortgage 
terms to their cash equivalent values. As a result, assessment performance in 
California has been subject to two distinct measures of uniformity, one based on 
2 
nominal sales prices (the Census) showing less uniformity than another based 
on the cash equivalent value of property. In 1986 eight other states -Arizona, 
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, and Minnesota - were also 
making systematic adjustments accounting for the captilization of favorable 
mortgage terms, placing them in similar circumstances as California. 
This paper will examine the relationship between assessment uniformity 
and the utilization of mortgages with favorable terms. It addresses the 
hypothesis th~t greater uti I ization of non-standard financing resu Its in a 
reduction in measured uniformity, given the Census reliance on nominal sales 
prices in calculating the COD. The effects of financing can thus distort the 
uniformity statistic, leading to problems of interpretation when the composition 
of mortgage credit varies across jurisdictions or over time. The effect of rational 
departures of nominal sales prices from market values on the COD is first 
presented for a simplified assessment environment. This is followed by a 
statistical analysis of interstate variations in the COD as related to the utilization 
of mortgages with favorable terms. 
The Effect of Favorable Mortgage Terms on Uniformity 
To illustrate the effect of favorable mortgage terms on assessment 
uniformity we portray a simplified assessment system where the assessed 
values of all properties are exactly representative of their full market values, i.e., 
AV=MV. (1) 
Housing sales in the jurisdiction, from which the COD is calculated, are 
comprised of two groups, one with conventional mortgage terms and the other 
3 
with favorable mortgage terms. The relationship between nominal sales prices 
and market values for each group of transactions is given as follows: 
SPi = MVi , i =1 ... k (conventional terms group); (2) 
SPj = MVj + Fj , j = k + 1 ... n (favorable terms group), (3) 
where the term Fj in equation 3 represents the capitalized value of favorable 
mortgage terms. 
The COD is defined as follows: 
COD = (AD/MAR) X 100, where (4) 
MAR = the median assessment ratio; 
AD = the average absolute A/S deviation from the median assessment 
ratio, 
= .!.. L AVi - MAR I + ..!... L I AVj - MAR I 
n i SPi I n j I SPj I 
(5) 
As a further simplification we limit the proportion of transactions involving 
favorable terms (s) to less than .5. This gives us, as a result, 
MAR= 1, and 




Solving for COD under these conditions gives the following: 
COD= 1 L IMVj -1 
j I MVj+Fj n 
= s . 1 
n-k 




x 100 ; (8) 
(9) 
(10) 
where f is defined as the average capitalized value of the favorable mortgage 
terms as a percentage of the nominal sales price in the transactions involving 
favorable terms. 
Equation 1 O shows the magnitude of pseudo-nonuniformity that is 
generated when nominal sales prices containing the capitalized values of 
favorable mortgage terms are used in calculating the COD. The size of this 
distortion is shown to depend on the extent to which non-standard financing 
characterizes transactions in the housing market, as well as the magnitude of 
capitalization of favorable terms in relation to nominal sales prices. For a given 
value off the distortion in the COD is maximized when s equals .5 . When s 
equals zero the COD is zero, and when s equals one the magnitude of the COD 
is determined by the variance of F/SP. 
5 
The Model and Empirical Results 
Data from the 1982 Census of Governments were selected to estimate 
the relationship between the COD and the utilization of non-standard mortgage 
credit. The following model was specified, using states as the unit of 
observation:2 
COD= f(S, s2, TAX, AC, AR, URB), where (11) 
COD= the composite coefficient of dispersion:3 
S =the percentage of sampled transactions with first mortgages that 
were loan assumptions or set ler contracts; 
TAX= the average effective property tax rate for existing single family 
homes with FHA-insured mortgages;4 
AC = an assessment cycle dummy variable (1 = periodic re- assessment 
is required by statute in the state); 
AR= the statewide average assessment ratio for single family (nonfarm) 
residential properties;5 
URB = the percentage of the state's single family (nonfarm) residential 
parcels located in SMSA counties. 
Both the linear and quadratic forms of the financing variable are included 
in the specification to conform with the relationship presented in the previous 
section.6 The remaining variables have been found to have an effect on the 
COD in other uniformity studies. Jurisdictions with higher effective tax rates 
tend to have more uniform assessments, given the potential for the larger 
benefits to be obtained from appeals [4]. Assessments are also more uniform in 
jurisdictions that make regular adjustments. More uniform assessments are 
typically associated with higher assessment ratios, because assessment at full 
6 
market value is more easily interpreted by property owners, and it offers less 
opportunity for assessors to fall out of conformance with state valuation 
standards [11]. Assessments in metropolitan jurisdictions are expected to be 
less uniform than those in rural areas given the greater diversity of housing 
characteristics and conditions found in urban housing markets [5]. 
The regression results 7 and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 
1. The R2 of .44 and overall F of 5.73 indicate modest explanatory power.8 The 
coefficients associated with the linear and quadratic forms of the financing 
variable have the expected signs and are significant at the .06 level.9 The 
assessment ratio also has the expected effect and is significant. The TAX and 
AC coefficients have the expected signs, but are not significant. 
Table 1 

































By setting the derivative of the regression equation with respect to S 
equal to zero and solving for S, we can determine the point where non-standard 
financing is estimated to exert maximal influence on the COD. The value 
obtained for S is 50.03 percent, which is consistent with our expectations. The 
total effect of non-standard financing on the COD at this point is then 
determined by the range over which S is evaluated. Setting the range at two 
standard deviations of S (from 23.2 to 76.8), non-standard financing produces a 
maximum increase of 10.8 units in the COD, which represents about 35 percent 
of its mean value. Decomposition of the mean COD at S = 50 percent thus 
gives two components of uniformity, one representing the level of "latent" 
dispersion (equalling 19.2), and the other representing dispersion attributable 
to using nominal sales prices in calculating the COD (equalling 10.8). In an 
ideal measure of uniformity only the latent component should be represented, 
and the confounding effects of nominal sales prices that include the capitalized 
value of favorable mortgage terms should be purged. Estimates of latent COD 
values for states falling in the S range set above are provided in the Appendix. 
These estimates are based on the observed values of S and s2 for each state. 
Regarding the results presented here, caution should be exercised for 
several reasons. First, estimates of the total effect of S on the COD are sensitive 
to the choice of the range of S over which the estimates are evaluated. Had we 
selected a range of one standard deviation rather than two, this would have 
produced a 2.7 unit change in the COD attributable to financing effects, versus 
the 10.8 unit change noted above. Second, the model specification is relatively 
anemic in its representation of the professional, procedural and technical 






In this paper we have examined the rational departure of nominal sales 
prices from market values in terms of the consequences for measuring 
assessment uniformity. The consequences of these rational departures were 
estimated to be substantial, generating an upward distortion in the COD. 
The mortgage credit environment of the early 1980's provided an ideal 
context for uncovering the effects of non-standard financing on assessment 
uniformity. First, transactions were nearly evenly divided between those 
employing conventional financing and those relying on financing with favorable 
terms. In addition, the mortgages with favorable terms provided substantial debt 
service savings to buyers which, in turn, were partially capitalized in sales 
prices. Studies during this period [10, 14] found the capitalized value of 
favorable mortgage terms representing about 10 percent of the nominal sales 
prices. 
The composition of the mortgage credit market has changed 
considerably since the early 1980's. This is evidenced in Table 2, which 
presents a breakdown of the sources of mortgage credit based on the 
Residential Mortgage Finance Panel surveys conducted by the National 
Association of Realtors. A sharp decline in assumption and seller financing 
occurs from 1982, when they comprised 59 percent of all first mortgages, 
through the first quarter of 1988, when they represented just 12 percent of first 
mortgages. This decline can be attributed to more vigorous enforcement of 
due-on-sale clauses in existing mortages as well as the general decline in 




loans and the incentive of sellers to offer below market financing to buyers who 
otherwise would not qualify for conventional mortgage credit. 
Taking the liberty of making dynamic inferences on the basis of cross 
sectional analysis, the post-1982 decline in the utilization of mortgages with 
favorable terms should have a beneficial effect on the COD's reported in the 
1987 Census of Governments, provided that other determinants of uniformity 
have not changed significantly in the interim.10 Given that the forthcoming 
COD's will more fully reflect the latent levels of uniformity, the returns to 
improvements in assessment practice noted by Welch [17] may become 
evident. An indictment of the uniformity statistic rather than the assessment 





Sources of First Mortgage Loans, 1982-88 
(Percentage Distributions) 
Apr '88 Oct'87 Oct'86 Oct'85 Oct'84 Sept '83 Aug '82 
Financial Institutions* 87 92 91 81 72 66 33 
Assumptions 8 4 6 9 18 22 41 
Sellers 4 3 2 4 8 8 18 
Others** 1 1 1 6 2 4 8 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: National Association of Realtors 
* Includes commercial banks, savings and loans associations, mutual savings banks and mortgage 
bankers 
** Includes private investors, friends, relatives, etc. 
Footnotes 
1. This research has been reviewed by Almy [3] and Bowman and Butcher [5]. 
2. The choice of states as the unit of analysis was dictated by the Census 
reporting of mortgage financing characteristics at the state level. Ideally, the 
analysis should be conducted at the local tax district level. In principle, 
aggregation of local tax districts can be justified given that the legislative 
and judicial bases of assessment practices are generally determined at the 
state level. However, it cannot be ensured that consistent implementation 
of state-wide standards is achieved in practice. 
3. The composite COD is the weighted average of the sampled COD's in a 
state, where the weights are proportional to the number of houses in the 
sampled jurisdictions. 
4. The data was taken from ACIR [1]. The effective property tax rates for four 
states (New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont and Alaska) were not 
reported for 1981. For these observations the 1980 effective tax rates were 
used. 
5. As with the composite COD, the average assessment ratio is a weighted 
average of the ratios for the sampled areas in each state, with the weights 
set in proportion to the number of houses in each area. 
6. This precludes the use of a logarithmic specification, which is the form 
employed in most studies of uniformity. Quadratic expansions of the other 
continuous variables were initially specified. These terms were not found to 
play a significant role in explaining the variation in the COD, and were 
subsequently dropped from the analysis. See Wonnacott and Wonnacott 




7. Correlations among independent variables were reviewed to identify the 
degree of colinearity. S and s2 were highly correlated, as one would 
expect. Otherwise, the strongest correlation observed (-.44) was between S 
and TAX. 
8. Studies limited to tax districts in a given state [5, 6] tend to perform better 
than this, while analysis at the interstate level shows about the same level 
of performance. Two outliers with very high COD's - North Dakota (78.9) 
and Texas (63.3) -were in part responsible for the modest R2. 
9. Ideally, the regression specification should also represent F/SP in the 
financing variables. However, this data is not available. The significance of 
the financing coefficients indicates that there was apparently not much 
interstate variation in F/SP. 
10. Clearly, this inference could be drawn with greater confidence had the 
analysis been based on pooled cross section-time series data covering 
Census years prior to i 981. Unfortunately, data on non-standard 
mortgages were not collected prior to the 1982 Census, and data collected 
since 1982 (e.g., the Residential Mortgage Finance Panel surveys) lacks 
the spatial detail of the Census mortgage data. 
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Estimated Latent Coefficients of Dispersion, 1981 
Estimated Effect Estimated 
State s of Son COD Reported COD Latent COD 
Alabama 57.6 9.9 53.6 43.7 
Alaska 34.4 7.1 13.6 6.5 
Arizona 68.4 5.7 26.8 21.1 
Arkansas 62.6 9.4 36.5 27.1 
California 57.6 9.9 32.4 22.5 
Colorado 63.2 8.2 28.4 20.2 
Delaware 39.8 9.2 26.1 16.9 
Florida 57.2 10.0 17.7 7.7 
Georgia 62.1 8.6 33.3 24.7 
Hawaii 70.1 4.7 17.1 12.4 
Illinois 35.0 7.3 23.0 15.7 
Indiana 38.5 8.8 50.0 41.2 
Iowa 42.0 9.8 21.4 11.6 
Kansas 44.2 10.2 37.8 27.6 
Kentucky 48.1 10.7 23.5 12.8 
Lousiana 42.7 10.0 35.8 25.8 
Maine 47.4 10.7 21.1 10.4 
Maryland 47.2 10.6 21.9 11.3 
Michigan 48.8 10.8 21.7 10.9 
Minnesota 51.6 10.8 27.1 16.3 
Mississippi 60.5 9.1 35.4 26.3 
Missouri 45.9 10.5 55.4 44.9 
Montana 62.4 8.5 33.5 25.0 
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Nebraska 44.0 10.2 20.3 10.1 
Nevada 58.8 9.6 23.0 13.4 
New Hampshire 34.4 7.1 15.2 8.1 
New Jersey 27.6 3.2 15.4 12.2 
New Mexico 57.4 10.0 38.5 28.5 
New York 39.9 9.2 35.4 26.2 
North Carolina 56.5 10.2 25.1 14.9 
North Dakota 43.7 10.2 78.9 68.7 
Ohio 34.0 6.9 22.8 15.9 
Oklahoma 48.6 10.7 35.2 24.5 
Oregon 59.1 9.5 13.3 3.8 
Pennsylvania 30.6 5.1 42.0 36.9 
Rhode Island 29.8 4.6 20.6 16.0 
South Carolina 47.5 10.7 40.9 30.2 
South Dakota 60.5 9.1 24.9 15.8 
Tennessee 54.4 10.5 27.3 16.8 
Texas 55.8 10.3 63.3 53.0 
Utah 67.8 6.0 56.3 50.3 
Vermont 34.0 6.9 33.9 27.0 
Virginia 55.8 10.3 21.4 11. i 
Washington 63.8 7.9 18.7 10.8 
West Virginia 37.2 8.3 30.5 22.2 
Wisconsin 26.6 2.5 12.4 9.9 
Wyoming 54.7 10.4 40.9 30.5 
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